I would like to second what Bob said. Having worked with NASA for the past 20 years, (mostly Shuttle escape system) The safety review can be extremely laborious and difficult to reason out. In fact, I've often seen in safety reviews where minor concerns get elevated way out of their importance and important ones ignored. At best it is frustrating. Here we are, 20 years into use and 3 years before end of flight and we are still reviewing the escape system safety documentation. Make's one's head spin. ...Mike WA6ARA

From: "Robert Bruninga" bruninga@usna.edu

Subject: [amsat-bb] Ham Radio Astronaut procedures.

To: amsat-bb@amsat.org

Message-ID: 035401c74c56$ff9e95b0$42577a83@SGSbb

Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"

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What made the man-safety issues of PCSAT2 costly? Didn't you just agree to power PCSAT2 off for long periods of time whenever the need arose?

I'll answer this on the AMSAT-BB to share the pain.

This should be a real eye-opener as to what the space business is like from the inside out...

A 2W TX on shuttle or ISS is considered a catastrophic safety hazard due to potential for loss of life due to interference or reset of the space suit, or shuttle ISS control systems or anything else.