If the Amcom code can be opened up and shared that would be great.  Even if it is just the routine that creates the digest and encrypts it.

I don't know Heimir.  Can you introduce us? 

73
Chris


On Fri, Sept 15, 2023, 21:58 Burns Fisher (AMSAT) <wb1fj@fisher.cc> wrote:
Why don't you talk to Heimir.   I still think we should try to re-use as much code as possible, in particular AMCOM.  Heimir can figure out how AMCOM does it.  I don't object to changing it for Golf for that matter, except that it is getting later and later and there will soon be a lot more software requirements.

73,

Burns Fisher, WB1FJ
AMSAT(R) Engineering -- Flight Software


On Fri, Sep 15, 2023 at 2:21 PM Chris Thompson via pacsat-dev <pacsat-dev@amsat.org> wrote:
I did not implement it yet.  It would go in Command task.c and replace or perhaps duplicate the authenticate function.

Feel free to code it.  

I don't know if we will ultimately go this way.  I would still like to make the AES authentication work but I agree this could be simpler and faster.  So it would be good to test it.

Chris 

On Fri, Sept 15, 2023, 11:20 Corey Minyard <minyard@acm.org> wrote:
On Fri, Sep 15, 2023 at 10:06 AM Chris Thompson via pacsat-dev
<pacsat-dev@amsat.org> wrote:
>
> Ok, thanks for that Corey.  Very interesting.  We may not be susceptible to the length extension attack vulnerability though.  If I understand correctly, then a message sent as: Hash( key + "Watch the enemy") could be manipulated to Hash(key + "Watch the enemy and attack them after 5 mins"), without knowing the key.  But our commands are fixed at 18 bytes length (for now at least). So any extra appended message would be ignored.  With that said, it may not be much harder to implement the scheme as described.

Yes, I was more worried about the "various security papers have
suggested vulnerabilities with this approach" comment in the article
on the key || message || key approach.  It probably means there are
other issues with the approach, possibly key extraction attacks.  The
HMAC approach seems generally more cryptographically sound.

I was going to say that I could implement it, though it's pretty
trivial.  You've probably already done it :).

-corey - AE5KM

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